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Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of recent vertical and horizontal 
mergers in the U.S. industry for audiovisual media content, including the AT&T-
Time Warner and the Disney-Fox mergers. Using a theory-driven approach, we ex-
amine economic effects of these types of mergers on market competition, focusing 
on digital media content distribution.  
In doing so, we address three research questions: (i) Is the current development of 
analyzing industry with its recent merger activity concerning? (ii) Would vertical or 
horizontal integration be more preferable for overall welfare and competition in 
this industry? (iii) What are implications for antitrust policy? 
We conclude from our analysis that in the already highly horizontally concentrated 
U.S. market for audiovisual content the process of further vertical integration cre-
ates concerns from a competition policy perspective. Moreover, even though hori-
zontal concentration on some of the market stages may be anticompetitive as well, 
vertical integration is likely to be more harmful. As a consequence, we recommend 
a stricter approach to vertical merger control in this industry, as well as a more ac-
tive abuse control against already vertically-integrated media companies. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent wave of mergers in the U.S. media industry has the potential to directly 
affect millions of consumers. However, the antitrust policy controlling the (anti-
)competitive effects of these mergers is subject to debate. For instance, the failed 
attempt of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to block the vertical merger be-
tween AT&T and Time Warner caused considerable controversy both in academics 
and in antitrust policy (inter alia, Caffarra et al. 2018, Salop 2018a, 2018b, Wright 
& Rybnicek 2018). In addition, the horizontal merger between Walt Disney (Disney) 
and Twenty-First Century Fox (Fox) took place this year and increased concentration 
among producers of content. Since these cases may influence further dynamics of 
the U.S. media industry and are likely to fuel another wave of media mergers, both 
horizontal and vertical ones, these developments give rise to significant concerns 
for the workability and sustainability of the competitive process in the related mar-
kets.  
It should be noted that the affected industry is already highly concentrated and the 
companies themselves represent holdings with many subsidiaries in different mar-
ket segments. Furthermore, due to a specific characteristic of these segments, the 
question arises whether the general wisdom holds in this special case, that is, that 
vertical mergers are always less anticompetitive than horizontal mergers. Thus, im-
portant questions that we discuss in this contribution are: (i) Is the current state 
and development in the U.S. market for audiovisual content - regarding M&A activ-
ities - concerning? (ii) Would a development towards more vertical or more hori-
zontal mergers be more preferable for overall welfare and competition? (iii) What 
are possible antitrust policy implications, given the current characteristics of the 
market? Should regulators rather accept false positives or false negatives?  
In order to provide some background for this discussion, we consider the current 
state of U.S. production of audiovisual content and identify the main economic 
functions of industry players and their connections. We propose the concept of an 
aggregated value chain in order to make merger processes more visible and acces-
sible for analysis. Along with traditional theories of merger analysis we consider 
some arguments, which were previously neglected in the courts’ decisions (i.e., in-
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terdependency of different regulations and relevance of data collection). We dis-
cuss effects of both horizontal and vertical integration and compare them. By ad-
hering to this approach, we aim to combine insights from existing literature on 
both horizontal concentration and vertical integration, which are usually discussed 
separately (i.e. vertical mergers, inter alia, Riordan 2005, Salop & Culley 2016, 
Crawford et al. 2018 and horizontal mergers, inter alia, Ivaldi et al. 2003, Kovacic 
2009).  
We conclude from our analysis that the current development of the U.S. market for 
audiovisual content is a cause for concern and the process of further vertical inte-
gration in the already highly horizontally concentrated market should be consid-
ered as being very harmful from a competition policy perspective. The traditional 
rule of thumb that horizontal mergers create anticompetitive harm with higher 
probability than vertical ones and, therefore, their regulation should be stricter 
must be questioned in the U.S. media industry. By contrast, more horizontal con-
centration on some of the market stages – although being most probably anticom-
petitive as well – is likely to be less harmful than further vertical integration. Thus, 
we recommend a stricter merger control policy against vertical mergers: it is better 
to risk false positive decisions in this industry than to suffer (another) false nega-
tive. Additionally, a stricter abuse control of the already vertically-integrated com-
panies, which have started to engage in blackout strategies against non-integrated 
rivals, is recommendable. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 gives an overview of the U.S. market 
for audiovisual content and its current merger cases. Section 3 provides an analysis 
of economic theories applied to the merger cases. In section 4 the main research 
questions are discussed and our principal conclusions are presented.  
 
2. The U.S. Industry for Audiovisual Content  
2.1 Market Development and Structure   
The U.S. production of audiovisual content and the respective market structure of 
media companies are deeply connected to the Hollywood studio system and its de-
velopment in the 20th century. To show the degree of integration, collaboration 
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and dominance of the major media companies, we provide a brief overview of Hol-
lywood’s history and most notable antitrust cases. Moreover, we visualize the cur-
rent state of the market and its structure to demonstrate the extent of integration 
and the dimensions of further (horizontal and vertical) integration.  
After a brief period of thriving competition (around 1900) there was a strong ten-
dency towards oligopoly structures in the U.S. film industry (McDonald 2000). The 
first antitrust suit against an alliance of equipment manufacturers, the Motion Pic-
ture Patents Company (MPPC), was launched in 1914 (Conant 1960, Gomery 1986). 
Thereafter, a few major players emerged and the trend towards a powerful few 
that dominate the market prevailed ever since. The biggest studios1 of the so-called 
Golden Age (or Studio Era between 1930 and 1949) engaged in vertical integra-
tion, product differentiation and international distribution, which increased their 
bargaining power (Gomery 1986) and provoked more than one antitrust suit: (i) 
the 1946 decision against block-booking (forcing cinemas to buy film bundles ra-
ther than individual films) to reduce vertical market power and (ii) the 1948 Para-
mount Decision, prohibiting the studios to hold stakes in cinema chains (McDonald 
2000). It was especially the latter that had severe impact on the market structure. 
Since the studios were cut off from direct audience access, they engaged in hori-
zontal concentration and diversification. Moreover, the studios focused on the dis-
tribution of films, usually financing outsourced productions to subsequently dis-
tribute them (so-called “financer-distributor”). (iii) In 1985, the case United States 
v. Capitol Service superseded the Paramount Decision, which led to a wave of rein-
vestments in theatre chains and, moreover, TV networks and home video enterpris-
es (Gomery 2004, Lewis 2008). Therefore, the Paramount Decision cut off vertical 
integration and led to horizontal extension, while the United States v. Capitol Ser-
vice case reintroduced the option of vertical integration, which heavily contributes 
to the present opaque market structure overall: highly (horizontally and vertically) 
integrated conglomerates engaged in multiple media markets.  
                                                          
1  Most of the top players are still well-known: the “Big Five” or “Majors”, which include Para-
mount, Loew’s (later MGM - Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer), Warner Brothers, Twentieth Century Fox 
and Radio-Keith-Orpheum, dominated the business, while Universal, Columbia and United Art-
ists (UA) formed the “Little Three” or “Minors”. Some independent producers, usually working 
with UA, remained in the market (Gomery 1986). 
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Today’s U.S. film industry (a network of holdings, parent companies, joint ventures, 
and subsidiaries) is very nontransparent and the role of the different players is not 
easy to determine. During the long history of media companies, different terms 
evolved to describe the various players in the market. In our paper, we want to fo-
cus on the most important economic roles to reduce complexity and shed light on 
the relevant aspects in terms of competition economics. Traditionally, there is a dif-
ferentiation between content production, distribution, and exhibition (Litman 
1998). Instead of using these traditional terms, we introduce a simplified model of 
content delivery to reduce complexity and highlight central economic roles (see fig-
ure 1). The term “distribution” is recently being employed in different ways – at 
times denoting the licensing part and at times referring to publication/exhibition 
(e.g., in cinemas or broadcasting) or even the technical provision of access (e.g., 
online access). See figure 1 for our differentiation and illustration of a vertical 
chain, including the levels of vertical integration (stages 1-3).  
 
Figure 1 Vertical Chain of Content Delivery 
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Since most film companies typically control production (either as “financer-
distributor” or by producing themselves) and distribution of content (here: licens-
ing), we integrate these functions and call them content providers (CoP) (stage 1 
of vertical integration). The “publishers” of the content (inter alia, cinemas, TV 
channels or video on demand (VoD) platforms) are referred to as content access 
providers (CAP). Stage 2 is the forward integration of CoPs and CAPs to integrated 
content providers (ICP), for instance, Warner owns the channel HBO or Disney the 
ABC network. The last stage (3) in the vertical chain are technical access providers 
(TAP), such as TV and internet cable providers, enabling the technical access for 
consumers. A fully integrated provider (FIP) covers all stages of the vertical chain. 
The recent phenomenon of stage 3 integration, for instance, in the merger cases of 
Comcast-NBC Universal (NBCU) and AT&T-Time Warner, raised concerns that this 
level of vertical integration causes new competition problems. Table 1 provides an 
overview of the major U.S. media companies, which are relevant from antitrust per-
spective and, moreover, displays the level of integration among them.2 Notably, in 
both cases of vertical integration (AT&T and Comcast), the mergers lead to com-
plete coverage of the vertical chain, from the production of content to consumer 
access. The horizontal merger between Disney and Fox reduces the number of 
companies from six to a potential “Big Five” that dominate the U.S. audiovisual 
market. 
                                                          
2  Only companies with considerable market shares of each stage are considered. Small subsidiaries 
and co-productions, which are irrelevant to competition concerns, are excluded. 
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Table 1 Overview of Biggest U.S. Media Companies (2019) 
 
Legend 
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Walt Disney - Walt Disney Studios 
(incl. Pixar and Lu-
casfilm) 
- Fox Entertainment 
Group 
 
Sony - Sony Pictures Enter-
tainment (incl. Co-
lumbia Pictures) 
 
AT&T - Time Warner (incl. 
HBO, Turner Broad-
casting System, 
Warner Bros.) 
- AT&T Communications 
(incl. AT&T Internet (DSL),  
AT&T Internet (Fiber),  
AT&T Wireless (Wireless),  
DirecTV) 
Viacom - Paramount Network 
(incl. SPIKE) 
 
Comcast - NBC Universal (incl. 
Universal Pictures) 
- Comcast with its Cable 
Communication (XFINITY; 
cable internet) and Broad-
cast Television segments 
 
 
9 
 
2.2 Landmark Cases  
2.2.1 Comcast - NBCU  
The Comcast-NBCU case began in January 2011 with a civil antitrust action to per-
manently enjoin the proposed vertical merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
and a simultaneously issued Competitive Impact Statement. Both were issued by 
the United States Government and several single states. In February 2011, a Stipu-
lation and Order that would allow the merger to take place was signed by the 
court. With that, defendants agreed to publish a newspaper notice of the merger, a 
summary of its terms, and a copy of the Proposed Final Judgement – at their ex-
pense (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2011a). After pub-
lishing this information, there was a sixty-day notice in which public comments 
could be submitted. The eight public comments that were received strengthened 
the government’s opinion that the proposed Final Judgement would be an appro-
priate remedy for the antitrust violations, which resulted from the merger and were 
brought up in the complaint (United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia 2011c). In July 2011, the court held a fairness hearing, where the plaintiffs and 
the defendants had the opportunity to present their arguments. The Final Judge-
ment was published in September 2011. With that, Comcast was allowed to ac-
quire a 51 percent stake in NBC Universal from General Electric. To cope with po-
tential uncertainties regarding the Final Judgement’s implementation, Judge Leon 
issued a Memorandum Order that should secure that the Final Judgement satisfies 
the public interest. Content of this Memorandum Order was the creation of an an-
nual report that had to be published by the defendants for two years after the 
merger, indicating details on arbitrations of online video distributors (OVDs) under 
the FCC order3 (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2011b). In 
2013, Comcast bought the remaining 49 percent of NBCU from General Electric in 
order to take control over all aspects of the business. The possibility to buy the re-
maining stakes was provided by the agreement in 2011, even if it was not expected 
to happen so quickly. With the selling of the rest of NBCU, General Electric realized 
their plan to get out of the entertainment business, whereas Comcast gained com-
                                                          
3  For deeper insights on the dual-track arbitration mechanism OVDs may use, see the Supple-
mental Statement (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2011d).  
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plete control over the important businesses of broadcasting, cable networks, movie 
studios, and theme parks (Reuters 2013).  
 
2.2.2 AT&T - Time Warner 
In October 2016, AT&T and Time Warner announced their planned deal to merge. 
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division started an investigation that 
lasted longer than a year   - ending in November 2017, when the government filed 
a lawsuit against AT&T, DirecTV, and Time Warner in order to enjoin the proposed 
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18. The DOJ complained that 
the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition through the increased 
bargaining leverage of AT&T, because they could have incentives to use their power 
over Time Warner content in order to harm competitors. Shortly after the govern-
ment’s complaint, Time Warner sent a letter and a proposed arbitration agreement 
to about 1,000 video distributors where it guaranteed that no blackout of their 
content would occur once arbitration was invoked. With 23 days of proceeding, the 
trial started in March 2018. Judge Richard J. Leon (the same judge as in the Com-
cast-NBCU case) issued the ruling in June 2018, in which he concluded that the 
government had failed to meet its burden to show that the proposed merger is 
likely to substantially lessen competition in the manner the government had stated 
in its complaint (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2018b). 
About one month later, the DOJ submitted an appeal against the decision (United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 2018). In November 
2018, first evidence for the anticompetitive behavior of AT&T was already showing; 
HBO (now under control of AT&T) went dark for DISH and DISH-Sling, who are two 
of the main competitors of AT&T’s television services DirecTV and DirecTV Now (Wu 
2018). However, in February 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals backed the merger. 
This decision caped off the protracted legal battle between AT&T and the DOJ, 
which declared its intention to not appeal the ruling (United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit 2019). 
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2.2.3 Walt Disney - Fox  
The most recent of the three cases is the horizontal merger of Disney and Fox. 
There was a bidding war between Disney and Comcast about the Fox assets for 
sale. With its highly profitable and valuable cable group (especially in terms of re-
gional sports networks) and their stakes in the online video platform Hulu, the Fox 
assets were the target of negotiations between the two bidders. Comcast made the 
higher bid; yet, Fox decided to go for the Disney bid because it saw a higher prob-
ability of an approval by the DOJ (Reuters 2018). In fact, the proposed merger be-
tween Disney and Fox was approved by the DOJ in the summer of 2018 under a 
settlement that would potentially resolve the competitive harm emerging from the 
merger. Disney had to sell 22 regional sports networks to get the permission to buy 
the proposed Fox assets (DOJ 2018). The European Commission approved the ac-
quisition in November 2018, albeit under certain conditions. In the European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA), Disney has to divest all its interests in the five channels it controls 
in a joint venture with Hearst. With the selling of these interests, there would be no 
more overlap between the interests of Disney and Fox in the EEA, thus no more 
competition concerns (European Commission 2018). Nevertheless, the bidding war 
between Walt Disney and Comcast is by far from over. To increase their influence 
on the European markets, both companies are competing to buy Sky, which is al-
ready partly owned by Fox (Reuters 2018). 
 
3. Economic Theories in Merger Analysis 
When putting forward arguments against mergers in the media sector, there are 
several economic concepts and models used by the DOJ Antitrust Division. This 
chapter examines the ones used in the three above described cases, namely Com-
cast-NBCU, AT&T-Time Warner, and Walt Disney-Fox. It, furthermore, discusses the 
potentially missing arguments. As a result, we provide a broad overview of the 
economic reasoning, which speaks for or against a vertical or horizontal merger in 
this industry, and use it to answer our main research questions in chapter 4.  
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3.1 Foreclosure 
The concept of foreclosure is commonly used when examining possible effects of a 
merger – both horizontal and vertical. In the cases of Comcast-NBCU and AT&T-
Time Warner, the DOJ especially stressed the aspect of vertical foreclosure, where-
as, in the Walt Disney-Fox case, horizontal foreclosure strategies4 were not men-
tioned as a possible anti-competitive effect of the merger. For this reason, the pre-
sent paper will concentrate mainly on (i) vertical foreclosure and the potential wel-
fare effects coming from this strategy. Nevertheless, (ii) horizontal market power is 
required for vertical foreclosure actions, such as blackout threats. As chapter 2 has 
shown, there is high horizontal market concentration in the market for audiovisual 
content. Therefore, preconditions for negative foreclosure effects of additional ver-
tical mergers are given through the current market design.  
(i) Vertical foreclosure – partial or complete – after a merger is possible because of 
the different supply stages in this market. The increased market power after such a 
merger leads to an increased ability of the now vertically integrated firm to raise 
input and consumer prices, to deny downstream competitors access to important 
inputs or to decrease the quality of them or to exclude competitors by building bar-
riers to market entry – which is what protects this market power in a long-term. 
Going hand in hand with increased market power is increased bargaining power 
that can occur for different reasons. For instance, it can occur through exclusive 
access to rights or other inputs (bottleneck-problem), a higher market share of the 
merged entity and overall less competition in the market or even by covering the 
entire value chain through a vertically integrated company and, therefore, being 
independent from competitors in up- and downstream markets. The overall incen-
tives for exclusionary behavior in terms of pricing, marketing, or input and con-
sumer foreclosure can be increased (Riordan & Salop 1995, Salop & Culley 2016).  
                                                          
4  Such as tying bottleneck goods from different markets and other kinds of raising-rivals-cost-
behavior, as well as building entry barriers and other deterrence practices (for deeper insights 
see inter alia: Rey & Tirole 2007) 
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Firms have to negotiate for different contracts, which may be incomplete5, and this 
may raise post-merger incentives for the integrated firm to discriminate competi-
tors in terms of prices, quality, etc. (see Riordan 2005). The higher the bargaining 
power on one side of the negotiations, the “better” the outcomes are for this side, 
for instance, in terms of profits. Depending on the exact reason for the higher bar-
gaining power, the more powerful negotiation side could use this power in differ-
ent ways.  
In a supply chain without vertically integrated companies, CAPs have to negotiate 
with CoPs and TAPs separately and the respective bargaining power between them 
is likely to be more balanced compared to a market situation including at least one 
FIP. After a vertical merger, a dynamic development can be expected: in the short 
term, the bargaining power of a CAP (compared to the power of the newly build 
FIP) is likely to remain the same – e.g., because of existing subscription contracts 
and other lock-in effects. But in long-term, due to their potentially increased bar-
gaining power as described above, the FIP has the power and potential incentive to 
discriminate up- and downstream competitors, such as Netflix in figure 2. This may 
be especially true for a strong CAP with significant market shares and market pow-
er, such as the here described example of Netflix, whereas smaller CAPs with less 
subscribers and market power may suffer from the discrimination through the FIP 
immediately (see, e.g., the blackout of HBO content for DISH right after the AT&T-
Time Warner merger in November 2018).  
Figure 2  Foreclosure threats for CAPs   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5  Meaning, these contracts do not have enough “power” to control behavior and especially pre-
vent opportunistic behavior of (at least one of) the contracting partners (see Riordan 2005 for 
more insights and further literature). 
Potential Input Foreclosure Potential Customer Foreclosure 
Content Provider (CoP)  
– Time Warner 
 
Content Access Provid-
er (CAP)  
– Turner Networks 
 
 
Technical Access 
Provider (TAP)  
– AT&T Cable 
 Content Access Provid-
er (CAP) 
 – Netflix  
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A main aspect in the two highlighted cases was the possible threat of so-called 
“blackouts”, arising from the post-merger higher bargaining power of the vertically 
integrated firms (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2011b, 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2018b). These blackouts 
can occur in two ways (see Salop 2018a): (a) input foreclosure, where the CoP (for 
example, Time Warner’s subsidiary Turner Networks) holds back valuable, so-called 
“must-have-content”6 from CAPs that are competing with their own TV channels 
and VoD-platforms. One main input foreclosure concern in the AT&T-Time Warner 
case was that the merged entity would gain market and, therefore, bargaining 
power to raise the prices for Time Warner content (United States District Court of 
the District of Columbia 2018b). If OVDs or other CAPs would refuse to pay these 
higher prices, the FIP could withhold the must-have-content – “go black” on the 
CAPs – and, therefore, force them to pay the higher prices in order to stay competi-
tive. Generally speaking, the upstream part of the merged entity could restrict sup-
ply, decrease quality, or raise input prices for downstream competitors. Clearly, 
such a blackout would cause monetary losses for both the upstream firm and the 
downstream competitors. Nevertheless, the post-merger improved bargaining posi-
tion of the FIP decreases these losses for the upstream division compared to a 
blackout-situation without the vertical integration - the FIP covers all stages of the 
supply-chain and is, therefore, able to reach consumers without having to collabo-
rate with other CAPs or TAPs than their integrated divisions (Salop & Culley 2016).  
Concerning input foreclosure, the overall welfare effects from vertical integration in 
the programming sector can differ, depending on whether regulation in terms of 
program access rules (e.g., of the FCC) is working. If there are rules that ensure that 
competitors still have access to valuable content, welfare effects can be seen as 
mostly positive. If there are no such rules, welfare effects tend to be negative 
(Crawford et al. 2018).  
                                                          
6  Time Warner, with its three units Warner Bros., Turner, and HBO, produces famous TV shows 
like Game of Thrones, as well as live news, and it holds the broadcasting rights for big sports 
events. These content types face a high consumer demand. Therefore, the DOJ argued that 
CAPs have to include at least some of these Time Warner “must-have-contents” into their offers 
to stay competitive in the market (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
2018a: 30-36). 
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The other way a blackout could occur is (b) customer foreclosure, when a TAP (like 
AT&T cable) decides to go dark on a CAP. This means they throttle or completely 
block content from specific CAPs, which leads to a lower quality of the stream or 
no accessibility of the content at all. In general, customer foreclosure can occur af-
ter a vertical merger, when the downstream part of the merger refuses to buy in-
puts from other upstream firms than the one it is merging with (Salop & Culley 
2016). Even if it was not part of the DOJ’s argumentation in the AT&T-Time Warner 
case (in contrast to the Comcast-NBCU merger case), customer foreclosure is one 
major concern in terms of vertical mergers in the media sector overall (Salop 2018a, 
Caffarra et al. 2018). In terms of the online and offline video supply chain (see fig-
ure 2), the now vertically integrated TAP could choose to only broadcast content 
from its now merged upstream entity. This potentially leads to losses (in terms of 
fewer subscribers and, consequentially, monetary losses) for the upstream divisions’ 
competitors (non-integrated CAPs) because of a lower quality stream/signal or even 
a lack of technical access to their consumers.  
Both foreclosure methods can be seen as a form of raising rivals’ costs – in either 
the upstream or the downstream market targeted by the FIP – by restricting key 
input factors, such as must-have content (Krattenmaker & Salop 1986), or by re-
stricting the distribution of content in terms of access to the audience. These 
blackouts potentially lead to subscriber/viewer losses for the FIPs’ competitors in 
the online (VoD) and offline (TV channels) markets. In the end, these raising rivals’ 
costs approaches can lead to competitors decreasing their investments or even exit-
ing the market – with negative effects for competition and overall welfare (Salop & 
Culley 2016). To demonstrate potential costs for competitors and consumers in the 
AT&T-Time Warner case, the DOJ and their economic expert Carl Shapiro used a 
Nash bargaining model, similar to the model used in the Comcast-NBCU case. Us-
ing the general assumptions of the Nash bargaining model, Shapiro demonstrated 
that an increased minimum price the sellers are willing to accept (due to price in-
creases post a vertical merger) leads to an overall higher negotiated input price (the 
price that CAPs have to pay for Turner content), which eventually leads to higher 
consumer prices (Nash 1950, United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia 2018b).  
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(ii) Regarding horizontal media mergers, foreclosure is less likely to occur. The in-
centives to foreclose for a strictly non-vertically-integrated company (i.e. no com-
mercial activity on the other market stages of figure 1) on every level of the supply 
chain – even in case of a monopoly on that market level – are lower than they are 
for vertically integrated firms. If, for instance, a CAP like Netflix would be a monop-
olist on the market, there would be low incentives to blackout upstream or down-
stream competitors – either they would decrease their content variety (by foreclos-
ing upstream CoPs) or they would have less direct access to end-consumers (by 
foreclosing downstream TAPs). Both practices would decrease consumer satisfac-
tion and, therefore, profits for the CAP; a wider variety of content and better tech-
nical accessibility potentially lead to more subscribers and the possibility to raise 
monopoly prices even more. The only conceivable situation in which a monopolistic 
CAP could have incentives to foreclose upstream firms (CoPs) is if they try to pro-
mote their own self-produced content by providing less content from other CoPs – 
which requires an internal vertical integration of said monopolistic CAP. Neverthe-
less, this would again potentially lead to less heterogeneity of content and, there-
fore, a worse meeting of their consumers’ preferences.  
This kind of argumentation can be applied to the two other market stages as well, 
showing that foreclosure incentives depend on the vertical dimension  and start to 
be present with any vertical involvement. By contrast, strictly horizontal companies 
on any market level have little to no incentives to blackout up- or downstream 
firms.  
 
3.2 Pricing Strategies, Bundling, and Elimination of Double Marginalization 
In order to investigate the effects of vertical and horizontal mergers on pricing 
strategies, the nature of interactions between firms in a supply chain should be 
taken into account. Within the framework of the vertical chain of content distribu-
tion, illustrated in figure 1, there is only one level of setting prices between compa-
nies, i.e., CoPs and CAPs, and two levels with final prices for consumers – CAPs set-
ting the prices for content access, and TAPs setting the prices for technical access.  
It is possible to consider several alternative pricing strategies for merged firms: (i) 
raising prices due to non-coordinated (unilateral) effects, (ii) raising prices due to 
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coordinated effects, and (iii) reducing prices as a result of gained efficiencies. These 
strategies can be applied both as a consequence of horizontal and vertical mergers; 
however, the underlying reasoning differs: 
(i) Horizontal mergers, by definition, lead to at least marginal increase of the 
merged company’s power in the relevant market due to the elimination of 
competition between the merging parties. Thus, if company enjoys post-
merger market power, then possibility of its abuse arises. This always has a 
negative impact on market competition and consumers.  
Vertical mergers can enable two alternative strategies: (a) raising-rivals’ 
costs; (b) bundling of services. 
(a) Price discrimination towards competitors of their own subsidiaries repre-
sents a variant of a raising-rivals’ costs strategy. In the analyzed industry, this 
is possible in the case of the FIP level of integration (Comcast-NBCU, AT&T-
Time Warner) and in the ICP level. If the input price for non-integrated 
downstream competitors (CAPs) will rise (but not for the FIPs own CAP), 
then prices for their consumers will also increase. This may lead to reduction 
in the demand for their goods (Church 2008). At the same time the down-
stream CAP owned by the FIP or ICP gains benefits due to the possibility to 
offer a comparably lower consumer price and could, therefore, be in the po-
sition to attract more consumers at the expense of the independent CAPs. 
This scenario mirrors the blackout foreclosure scenario from the preceding 
section, albeit with different means. 
(b) Since services from CAP and TAP are complements, they can be offered as 
a bundle. The company has the ability to set up different prices of such a 
bundle (Fang & Norman 2006). First, the price of the bundle may be lower 
compared to separate offers. In ordinary markets, this may represent the 
strategy of using the bundle as a promotion tool. However, as in the case of 
the analyzed vertical mergers, in concentrated markets with low competition 
and existence of dominant products, the bundle may be sold at a lower price 
in order to deter fringe competitors on one of the market stages. For in-
stance, in a region where AT&T dominates the TAP market, it may decide to 
price the bundle of its TAP and its CAP substantially below the separate 
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units, so that consumers are lured into the bundle at the expense of an in-
dependent CAP competitor, like Netflix: the AT&T-TAP with Netflix will al-
ways be at a higher price than the AT&T-bundle, irrespective of what Netflix 
can do. This strategy effectively compares to anticompetitive forced bun-
dling. Notwithstanding, however, in such markets, there are also incentives 
to price the bundle higher than the separate offers in order to reap market 
power rents from locked-in consumers (Fang & Norman 2006: 951). Combin-
ing the strategies, it is possible to identify such incentives: first, the FIPs 
TAP/CAP-bundle will be sold cheaper than the competitors can price in order 
to drive consumers away from independent competitors and towards the 
FIP. Thus, the FIP will grow and reach a more powerful position in market. 
Once the market power of the FIP is sufficiently high (i.e., competitive pres-
sure from remaining fringe competitors is sufficiently low), it can profitably 
increase the bundle’s price and switch to the high price strategy. Additional-
ly, firms on the CAP-level gain benefits from network effects and can create 
lock-in effects (that decrease probability of switching), so they are primarily 
interested in reaching high amount of consumers and, only after period of 
time, price increasing strategies could be applied with higher outcome. 
Scenarios of market foreclosure (see section 3.1) could support higher mar-
ket power in both types of mergers. 
(ii) If horizontal or vertical merger influences the ability and willingness for co-
operation with direct competitors in order to achieve higher revenues, then 
another possibility to raising price strategy occurs. Discussion of specific 
conditions and difference of horizontal and vertical integration in this regard 
is provided in section 3.5. 
(iii) This pricing strategy is based on the idea of transferring parts of the compa-
ny's benefits, reached through the merger, to consumers. In horizontal mer-
gers, achievement of merger specific efficiencies seems to be easier to access 
since companies have many similarities in business structure and strategies. 
Of course, the range of possible efficiencies gained is usually wide and com-
panies-specific, but we can highlight some examples from different market 
stages. On the CoP stage, economies of scope may be achieved due to the 
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ability to produce different types of content by using common equipment; 
also R&D synergies in exchange of technological solutions and developing 
new ones may be achieved. Merged firms on the CAP stage may strengthen 
network effects and have synergies in R&D. The TAP stage, as a result of the 
horizontal merger, may reduce overlaps on the technical level, and therefore 
decrease companies’ costs.  
In case of vertical mergers, specific effect is elimination of double marginali-
zation (EDM). The main idea is that a margin in price, set by the merged 
company, will be lower than in the case of two separate companies within 
one supply chain. The traditional condition for analyzing this effect is a situa-
tion in which two companies have vertical supplier-customer relationships 
and each of them is a monopolist in its market. However, this analysis can be 
expanded for imperfect competition, as well (Hausman et al. 2002: 483-
484). In the case of AT&T-Time Warner merger, EDM could take place as fol-
lows: before the vertical integration, the price that AT&T payed to broadcast 
Time Warner’s Turner content included Time Warner's profit margin. After 
the merger, AT&T's marginal cost of licensing Turner content will be lower 
due to the assumption that the combined entity will take care of common 
profit. With these savings, AT&T will have the possibility and incentives to at-
tract consumers by price decreasing or by higher quality goods. Thus, posi-
tive effects for consumers will occur. According to the government's expert, 
Shapiro, EDM would result in savings for AT&T's customers that add up to 
$352 million annually (United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia 2018a: 67). These lower prices together with a better allocation of re-
sources are traditional arguments of welfare gains through vertical integra-
tion (Spengler 1950: 352). However, the existence of EDM itself does not 
prove that the merger is procompetitive, and that EDM will result in substan-
tial savings for consumers (Salop 2018). EDM may be overcompensated by 
incentives which lead to raise prices (strategies i-ii, see also Salinger 1988). 
Additionally, the problem of double marginalization could be solved without 
integration, for example, by setting mutually beneficial contracts (Church 
2008: 1468).  
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Moreover, the dynamic approach for firm development could be taken into ac-
count. Thus, it is possible to suggest a combination of strategies. For instance, a 
probable profit maximizing strategy for Disney-Fox may be to attract more con-
sumers (firms on the CAP level) in the short term via applying price strategy (iii). If 
during this time the company can strengthen its position in the market, gain a 
dominant position and reduce competitive pressure, then incentives may change. 
So, in long-term, pricing strategies (i) or (ii) may be applied and a rise of prices can 
be expected. For the AT&T – Time Warner case, similar incentives may appear: as 
presented in strategy (i(b)), that is, there are conditions under which switching be-
tween strategies becomes profitable. Unfortunately, the given situation in the me-
dia industry does not favor application of price reducing strategy (iii), and provides 
incentives for strategies (i) or (ii). 
Thus, there are similarities in incentives to apply different pricing strategies. How-
ever, increasing prices in the case of vertical mergers is expected to appear earlier 
than in horizontal ones.  
 
3.3 Barriers to Entry 
Due to short-term first-copy-cost effects and economies of scale in the long run, 
media markets are never perfectly contestable. However, the aim of this section is 
not to analyze classic entry barriers to media markets, but, instead, to show limita-
tions for newcomers attempting to challenge the highly (horizontally and vertically) 
integrated companies in this specific market. 
Vertical foreclosure (section 3.1) represents a barrier to entry, as the same strate-
gies to combat, deter and predate non-integrated competitors can also be em-
ployed to frustrate the entry of new (non-integrated) competitors on any of the 
market stages (CoP, CAP, TAP). Thus, to successfully compete with powerful market 
incumbents, entry requires a business model covering all three stages, which con-
siderably increases the costs of entry. In the online world, market entry on the 
stages of (i) TAPs and (ii) CAPs is already difficult due network effects, lock-in ef-
fects and one-stop-shop preferences, all favoring incumbents with strong market 
positions.  
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(i) Established TAPs are able to tie in customers to (long-term) internet and mo-
bile contracts. Thus, they have to stick with one provider in the long run, not 
being able to easily switch to a competitor. Moreover, if they are vertically 
integrated FIPs, they are able to offer bundles, e.g., internet and content ac-
cess. Consequently, FIP customers have one-stop-shop advantages, can re-
duce transaction costs and stay with familiar contracts and companies. This 
eventually leads to lock-in effects and path dependency. 
(ii) Similar effects can be observed on the CAP-level. Consumers do not want to 
tediously search which platforms offers the movie they are interested in, but 
prefer one platform for all contents. A horizontally integrated one-stop-shop 
reduces search costs and requires only one contract with a single (extensive) 
provider. Additionally, online platforms collect and analyze personal data 
and adjust content suggestions accordingly (Budzinski & Lindstädt-Dreusicke 
2018). Superior recommender systems can lead to lock-in effects on the con-
sumer side and advantages (horizontally and vertically) for market incum-
bents in possession of the respective information. Integrated firms, as FIPs or 
ICPs, can use the data collection to enhance product quality on the CoP-level 
(see chapter 3.5). Lastly, commonality effects should not be underestimated, 
since consumers maximize utility by information exchange and sharing. Ex-
clusive contents, which are subject to joint discussion (for instance, “Netflix 
Originals” or major sports events) can draw attention and enhance direct 
network effects in favor of incumbents.  
The resulting lock-in effects and network effects can all be used by incumbents to 
strengthen their position and fight new entry. Powerful FIPs may strategically in-
crease these structural barriers to entry (next to blackout threats discussed in 3.1) 
by artificially creating incompatibilities and rising switching costs.  
 
3.4 Effects on Innovation  
The degree of competition in a market has an effect on its dynamic efficiency (Ar-
row 1972). When it comes to horizontal mergers, like in the case of Walt Disney-
Fox, innovation incentives are lower than in a competitive environment since it 
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tightens the market structure (Reinganum 2008). Horizontal mergers can facilitate 
innovation by allowing firms to combine their knowledge as well as financial re-
sources (Hollenbeck 2018). However, cost efficiencies and knowledge spillovers 
usually do not compensate for the lack of innovation incentives from a welfare per-
spective (Federico et al. 2017, 2018). Therefore, horizontal mergers are generally 
not desirable for innovation, especially on the CoP-level in this industry, since the 
CoP-level is the level that innovates in terms of actual media content. With the cur-
rent market structure, less competition between CoPs leads to lower content diver-
sity, and hence, social welfare losses (Ivaldi et al. 2003), which are higher than the 
negative effects on innovation and welfare caused by horizontal mergers on any 
other level of the value chain. On the contrary, vertical integration also has an im-
pact on the innovation behavior of that firm and its competitors.  
The innovation incentives of a vertically integrated enterprise (FIP), like AT&T-Time 
Warner, differ from non-integrated competitors, since firms’ incentives to innovate 
also depend on the possibility of appropriating the results of the investments (Ar-
row 1972). The possibility of appropriating investments in R&D is higher the lower 
the competition (as less knowledge spillovers occur). Therefore, single investment 
decisions in innovation for a FIP are more likely to be profitable. However, even 
though low levels of competition cause higher appropriability, overall welfare is still 
higher with a considerable amount of competition as competitive pressure, includ-
ing when imitation of prior innovations forces firms to keep innovating (Clark 1961, 
Dasgupta & Stiglitz 1980). According to some parts of the literature, an optimal 
degree of competition from innovation perspective is neither found under high 
market concentration nor perfect competition (Schumpeter 1934, Aghion et al. 
2005).Furthermore, vertical integration may actually provide a gain in efficiency of 
innovative processes. It eliminates transactional dilemmas of knowledge like insuf-
ficient pre-contract information (asymmetric information) between separate stages 
of the value chain (Armour & Teece 1980). Relating to the market for audiovisual 
content, one specific form of content innovation is more likely if the enterprise is 
vertically integrated because of better coordination of upstream and downstream 
firms or lower costs of informational exchange (Salop 2018a). Consider the exam-
ple of Netflix using user data from its CAP activity as an input for developing 
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“House of Cards”, acting in the case of their original productions as a CoP.  
In the case of FIPs, innovation is not equally relevant on all levels of the value chain. 
If the downstream CAP as part of a vertically integrated enterprise is forced to dis-
tribute any content of any quality that is produced upstream, the incentive to inno-
vate on the CoP level is diminished. Since the upstream supplier does not face any 
negative consequences of not innovating, the incentive for this firm to invest in 
R&D is lower than it would be without the merger, reducing post-merger dynamic 
market efficiency (Kuhn 2004). 
On TAP-level, through the possibility of customer foreclosure by AT&T´s position as 
TAP, the incentives for innovation on the CAP-level are lower than they would be if 
no vertical integration had occurred. FIPs can, therefore, choose between two al-
ternative strategies: compete on the merits through innovation or handicap compe-
tition through the possibility of customer foreclosure of competing CoPs and CAPs 
through the FIPs TAP.  
The FIP is in a position where it can provide a disadvantage to competitors on the 
CAP-level and, therefore, has a smaller incentive to gain a competitive advantage 
through innovation. For instance, Time Warner is less likely to invest in the devel-
opment of a new streaming platform, since, due to the merger with the TAP, AT&T 
obtains the power to discriminate against its competitors, e.g., DISH (blackout of 
DISH & DISH-Sling in November 2018). The incentives are specifically strong if the 
independent, non-integrated competitor is a maverick that challenges the media 
industry incumbents with creative and innovative business models – like, for in-
stance, Netflix is challenging the CAP markets. If the incumbents succeed in deter-
ring the maverick, the negative effects on innovation must be expected to be par-
ticularly severe. If the clearance of the AT&T-Time Warner merger serves as a moti-
vation for a pursuit wave of vertical mergers in the industry, incentives to innovate 
may suffer considerably.   
 
3.5 Coordinated Effects 
Coordinated effects are more likely to occur among equals in terms of cost struc-
ture, production capacities, and product variety because it is easier for symmetric 
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competitors to reach a common understanding of the terms of coordination (Euro-
pean Commission 2008, Fabra & Motta 2013). Other factors influencing the proba-
bility of the occurrence of coordinated behavior are the number of competitors, 
(degree of) homogeneity of goods, and the probability and cost of detection of 
deviation from coordinated behavior (Ivaldi et al. 2003, Aigner et al. 2006).  
Several conditions under which anticompetitive coordinated effects after horizontal 
mergers are likely, are observable in the U.S. media industry. A lower number of 
competitors with somewhat symmetrical market power, as well as the existence of 
entry barriers with relatively stable demand and regularities in the market, especial-
ly raises the probability of coordinated behavior on the horizontal level of CoP and 
TAP. This is different on the CAP-level, where the market situation is less stable 
since new competitors are entering due to the relatively young and still dynamic 
video-on-demand market.  
With the high likelihood of their occurrence, coordinated effects are more often 
considered in horizontal media mergers. However, we argue that coordinated be-
havior is equally important in the evaluation of vertical merger cases. In the case of 
AT&T-Time Warner, there is a strong symmetry in structure with the other FIP Com-
cast, after their aforementioned 2011 merger with NBCU. Considerable market 
shares on all levels of the value chain after these mergers make coordinated effects 
more likely since there are now two symmetric competitors with parallel levels of 
vertical integration. The resulting danger of coordinated effects includes coordinat-
ed anticompetitive foreclosure strategies, i.e. coordinated boycotts of independent 
competitors (Salop 2018a, see chapter 3.1). Comcast and AT&T both have an incen-
tive to foreclose competing non-integrated CAPs, like DISH or Netflix, and have the 
means to do so in owning highly valuable (“must-have”) content for CAPs to deter 
competition and then divide the market among the symmetric FIPs. 
The probability of the occurrence of coordinated effects is high. Therefore, it must 
be considered when evaluating vertical mergers (United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia 2018b, Salop 2018a). Furthermore, vertical integration disal-
lows foreclosed downstream firms from disrupting upstream coordination, leading 
to a higher probability of the coordinated effects (Salop 2018a). The existence of 
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high innovation dynamics would lower the danger of coordinated effects because 
they render collusive behavior harder to sustain as they lower the punishment if 
market participants decide to deter from the coordinated behavior (pay-off from 
deviation). However, the discussed merger overall deteriorates innovation incen-
tives (see section 3.4), since the innovation incentive for a vertically integrated firm 
is only prevalent, as long as other firms do not vertically integrate as well (Liu 
2016). The symmetry of vertically integrated firms reduces innovation incentives by 
promoting and facilitating coordination among the symmetric FIPs. Additionally, 
the multimarket contacts of the FIPs, which exist manifold in the U.S. media indus-
try, further facilitate and stabilize coordinated behavior (Salop 2018a). 
The dominance of a coordinated oligopoly equilibrium of few powerful FIPs may 
also create umbrella effects for smaller fringe competitors to raise prices just below 
the level of the dominant firm - a specific version of a coordinated effect leading to 
lower consumer welfare.  
In summary, in the vertical setting of the current development in the U.S. media 
industry, symmetry and the possibility of foreclosure make a coordination equilibri-
um between the FIPs highly likely to occur and a loss of overall welfare very proba-
ble. Since the level of vertical integration in the media industry is indeed high, it is 
more useful for competition policy to consider coordinated effects of horizontal 
mergers in the context of its vertical counterparts. 
 
3.6 Institutional Economics: Interdependency of Different Regulations  
An issue that is often neglected in modern economics, as well as in contemporary 
antitrust discussions, is the interdependency of different institutional frameworks 
and regulations (Eucken 2006). Media companies are not only subject to general 
competition laws, but they are also targeted by special regulation. In the case of 
the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the rules they enforce 
are relevant. Focusing on online-related effects of the concentration and integra-
tion tendencies, the FCC’s net neutrality regulation is particularly interesting. The 
scope for anticompetitive behavior by (powerful) FIPs and ICPs is co-determined by 
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net neutrality rules, so that the effects of competition rules and net neutrality rules 
are intertwined. 
Corresponding to the different black-out scenarios discussed in section 3.1, net 
neutrality regulation deals, inter alia, with three potentially anticompetitive strate-
gies of internet service providers (inter alia, Faulhaber 2011, Krämer et al. 2013, 
Dewenter & Rösch 2016, Greenstein et al. 2016).  
(i) Throttling refers to an artificial and deliberate delay of processing data from 
specific services, for instance, from a competing streaming service. A FIP, like 
AT&T-Time Warner, may use its internet intersections to artificially slow 
down the streaming of Netflix contents, while duly processing the streaming 
of their own content. As a consequence, consumers will perceive a lower 
quality of Netflix streaming (i.e., bucking and interruptions during the 
stream) compared to the FIP streaming – although this difference in quality 
was artificially created by the FIP. 
(ii) Blocking represents an extreme variant of throttling as the contents of the 
competitors are not processed at all – and, thus, not available to the con-
sumer (black-out). 
(iii) Zero-rating in combination with data caps is a more indirect way to artificial-
ly disadvantage competitors. Many consumer contracts include data caps, 
i.e. if consumers excess a defined amount of data transfer per month, either 
extra prices have to be paid or further internet access is artificially slowed 
down. In this scenario, zero-rating means that a streaming service of the ver-
tically-integrated ISP (internet service provider) does not count towards the 
data cap. For instance, AT&T customers may be able to stream HBO without 
any data limits according to standard internet access contracts (as this data 
transfer is exempted from the data cap), whereas Netflix streaming contrib-
utes to exhausting the data cap. Consequently, consumers experience incen-
tives to focus their consumption on the FIPs streaming service and limit their 
consumption of competing services. 
From an economic perspective, all of these strategies represent anticompetitive 
raising-rivals-costs strategies. 
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Throttling and blocking were prohibited by FCC net neutrality regulation in the 
U.S., whereas zero-rating was regulated and, at the least, required to be made 
transparent to consumers (Federal Communications Commission 2015). However, 
this regulation was repealed in June 2018, so that all three strategies are now prin-
cipally legal under media-specific regulation (Paij et al. 2017). Note, however, that 
they may still be illegal under competition law if they represent an abuse of market 
power. 
Notwithstanding, there is an important difference between net neutrality regula-
tion and competition law with respect to throttling, blocking and zero-rating: while 
the enforcement of competition law largely depends on the market structure, i.e., a 
dominant position (at least in effect), net neutrality rules apply irrespective of the 
underlying market structure. Economic theory shows that anticompetitive, welfare-
decreasing effects are well possible in oligopoly situations. However, competition 
law is notoriously difficult to enforce in oligopoly markets (without legally-
unambiguously identifiable market power). Thus, changes in net neutrality rules 
(like in this case from prohibiting to allowing throttling and blocking) influence the  
(anti-)competitive effects of both vertical and horizontal mergers – but are not sub-
ject to merger control decisions. In the case of AT&T Time Warner, the prospects of 
anticompetitive effects have been escalated by the 2018 change in FCC net neutral-
ity rules, taking place in parallel to but independent from the merger control trial: 
the scope for conducting anticompetitive strategies has been enhanced because of 
an increased probability of getting away with it. The same is true for further (verti-
cal and horizontal) concentrations since – unfortunately from an economics per-
spective – U.S. competition law and policy usually do not pay attention to effects 
originating in the interdependency of different regulations. 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, we answer our main research questions, as stated previously: 
(i) Is the current state and development in the U.S. market for audiovisual con-
tent - regarding M&A activities - concerning?  
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(ii) Would a development towards more vertical or more horizontal mergers be 
more concerning in terms of overall welfare and competition?  
(iii) What are possible antitrust policy implications, given the current characteris-
tics of the market? Should regulators rather accept false positives or false 
negatives?  
Question (i) can be answered with the help of our analysis of the industry in chap-
ters 2 and 3. There is an ongoing development of the U.S. market for audiovisual 
content, which tends to lead onto more vertical mergers – partly because there are 
already only few big media companies due to horizontal merger activities. This high 
horizontal concentration of the market is a problem that is getting even worse with 
vertical mergers, such as AT&T-Time Warner7 and Comcast-NBCU. Therefore, ongo-
ing integration in this industry – vertical or horizontal – should be seen as concern-
ing in terms of negative effects on quality, innovation, prices, and access.  
Question (iii) can be answered using the so-called error cost framework (inter alia, 
Easterbrook 1984, Christiansen & Kerber 2006). Including all potential costs (e.g., 
welfare effects, expenses for the enforcement of antitrust policy, etc.) of possible 
decision errors, it is used to decide what kind of error would be more or less harm-
ful overall. These two potential errors are: prohibiting a merger that in fact has no 
negative effects on competition (Type I - false positive) or erroneously allowing an 
anti-competitive merger (Type II - false negative). The concept can be used to re-
view (merger) decisions ex-post and, therefore, help redesign competition and anti-
trust policy towards better decisions and more efficiency (inter alia, Kovacic 2009, 
Sokol 2010, Budzinski 2013, Budzinski & Stöhr 2018a). If it would be less harmful 
for overall welfare to have Type I decision errors rather than Type II errors, a strict 
merger policy would be advantageous. A more lenient policy would be appropriate 
if the error cost analysis concludes a benefit of more Type II and less Type I errors.  
The previous chapters have shown that vertical mergers – especially in the media 
industry with strong network effects and high barriers to entry – are a potential 
                                                          
7  In the most recent development of this case, The New Yorker uncovered how strongly President 
Trump wanted the merger to be blocked und tried to influence regulators (Mayer 2019). Alt-
hough we – like Shapiro (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2018b) and 
Salop (2018a) – also come to the conclusion that such a vertical merger should be regulated 
more strictly and this particular merger may have been blocked, we want to dissociate from 
Trumps “argumentation” and way of (antitrust) policymaking.    
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threat for competition and welfare. We come to the conclusion that a stricter con-
trol of vertical mergers in this industry would be advantageous in terms of overall 
welfare and costs. Our analysis has shown that merger control in the U.S. is wrong 
in terms of expecting vertical mergers to cause less welfare losses and negatives 
effects for competition than it is expected to occur post a horizontal merger. In the 
past decades, U.S. antitrust policy commonly acted this way and did not enforce 
vertical mergers in a strong enough manner. This should be changed, especially in 
markets where strong network effects and economies of scale occur (inter alia, Sal-
op 2018a). Although the enforcement of stricter merger policies is potentially more 
expensive (e.g., due to a probably wider monitoring of the market, more frequent 
interventions of antitrust agencies, etc.), positive welfare effects (respectively de-
creased negative effects) offset them in the long run. Under real-world conditions, 
where it is impossible to decrease decision errors of both types at the same time, in 
this industry it would be potentially less harmful to increase the number of Type I 
decision errors, whereas the number of Type II errors could be decreased – to even-
tually form a stricter control of vertical mergers and decrease negative post-merger 
effects (as, for example, already observed shortly after the AT&T-Time Warner mer-
ger with the DISH blackout). Besides this stricter merger control, a stricter abuse 
control of already vertically integrated companies would also be recommendable to 
prevent anticompetitive behavior, like the described blackout strategies.  
The analysis eventually results in the answer to the question (ii), whether vertical or 
horizontal mergers in this specific market are worse. Overall, with the special fea-
tures of the market for audiovisual content given, vertical mergers should be 
viewed as even more alarming than horizontal mergers. Through the high market 
concentration, due to the ongoing process of horizontal mergers (with the latest 
case of Walt Disney-Fox), companies on the market already have high horizontal 
market and bargaining power. Without vertical integration, other companies could 
possibly countervail this power on different market stages. However, this compen-
sation is impossible, if the horizontally powerful firms expand to other market 
stages and use their bargaining power there to carry out foreclosure strategies (as 
described in chapter 3.1) and/or raise barriers to entry (see chapter 3.4), for in-
stance. The market development in terms of merger activities should, therefore, be 
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considered as two-staged: in the first period, horizontal market power is built 
through merger activities on one market stage. This process can be seen as nearly 
completed in the market for audiovisual content – there are only few big compa-
nies with high market shares and, therefore, market and bargaining power left to 
rule the whole market (see table 1). In the second period, these horizontally power-
ful firms engage in vertical mergers to now cover the whole value chain – eventual-
ly they build a FIP. A main problem with these vertical mergers is that once there is 
such a FIP – leading to vertical bargaining power though the different market stag-
es – there is also horizontal market power on each of these stages, due to the po-
tential blackout threats, entry barriers, and else going out from the upstream part 
of the now merged entity. The other way round, horizontal market power on single 
market levels does not directly lead to vertical market power but can often be seen 
as countervailing power on these different stages. Whereas horizontal bargaining 
power (e.g., through horizontal mergers) on the CoP-, CAP-, and TAP-levels can 
have various negative effects (like price increases, innovation decreases, etc.), hori-
zontal mergers on each of these single market stages do not bear a high risk of 
market foreclosure, as it has been observed in vertical mergers (see chapter 3.1). 
This underlines the fact that vertical mergers in this concrete market should be con-
sidered worse – in terms of welfare and competition effects – than horizontal mer-
gers (without arguing that further horizontal concentration would be procompeti-
tive).  
Another special feature of the market that should be taken into account is the rele-
vance of a rich dataset. Through both types of mergers, horizontal and vertical, 
firms are able to combine their complete market datasets or data about individual 
customers. If firms merge vertically, not only can the data of one single market 
stage be combined, but besides the data concerning, for instance, content prefer-
ences of single consumers, companies can now combine this data with information 
about internet or mobile access packages this consumer is using or even individual 
motion and time profiles. With these extensive records, companies are in a better 
position for price discrimination, excluding smaller competitors with less data from 
the market, building barriers to enter the market, among other things (inter alia, 
Stucke & Grunes 2016). Besides these rather negative effects, FIPs, through their 
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wide complementary dataset, can also have positive impact on the quality of the 
overall service. For example, in terms of content, by meeting consumer preferences 
more accurate (see Netflix’ “House of Cards”-example) or in terms of offering con-
sumers complete bundles of audiovisual content and required technical access that 
meet their preferences better and are often lower in price. Nevertheless, these posi-
tive effects cannot outweigh the above-mentioned negative ones. The usage of 
(combined) personalized data as a means of payment, for price discrimination, or 
to adapt services to consumer preferences has ambivalent effects and the evalua-
tion of welfare effects depends strongly on assumptions about consumer behavior. 
In general, under the assumption of bounded-rational (“naïve”) consumers, incen-
tives for abusive strategies (in terms of pricing, anticompetitive conduct, etc.) are 
increasing with a wider dataset (inter alia, Budzinski & Stöhr 2018b).  
The current development of the U.S. market for audiovisual content is concerning 
in terms of antitrust and merger control aspects. We conclude that an ongoing 
process of vertical mergers in the horizontally already highly concentrated market 
should be considered much more harmful for competition and welfare than it has 
been until now. Based on our findings, we recommend a much stricter control of 
vertical mergers – especially in markets with special features, like strong network 
effects and high barriers for market entry, such as the one analyzed here.  
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